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Abstract
Although a number of approaches to finding bugs in systems code have been proposed, bugs still remain to be found. Current
approaches have emphasized scalability more than usability, and as a result it is difficult to relate the results to particular
patterns found in the source code and to control the tools to be able to find specific kinds of bugs.
In this paper, we propose a declarative approach based on a control-flow based program search engine. Our approach is
WYSIWIB (What You See Is Where It Bugs), since the programmer is able to express specifications for protocol and bug
finding using a syntax that is close to that of ordinary C code. Search specifications, called semantic matches, can be easily
tailored so as to either eliminate false positives or catch more potential bugs. We introduce our approach by describing three
case studies which have allowed us to find 395 bugs.
1. Introduction
In recent years, a multitude of approaches have been pro-
posed to scanning systems code for API protocols and bugs
in their usage [3, 4, 6, 8]. A goal of these approaches has
been to be highly scalable, and by using techniques such as
model checking, statistics, and data mining, it has been pos-
sible to apply these approaches to software of millions of
lines of code such as the Linux kernel. Some of these tools
have furthermore been successfully commercialized [2]. A
weakness of these efforts, however, is in the lack of user
interaction with the protocol-finding and bug-finding strate-
gies. Protocols are detected using complex heuristics that the
user has little control over [3, 6]. Automata-based languages
have been proposed for describing code patterns that consti-
tute bugs [3], but these specifications are difficult to relate
to the code structure. Both of these features make it difficult
for the user to understand why something is considered to
be part of a protocol or bug, or is overlooked, and thus to
identify the inevitable false positives and false negatives.
Based on an extensive study of Linux code, we have
observed that many of the API protocols used by Linux
code follow a common pattern, related to the purpose of the
protocol, such as error handling or managing the allocation
of memory. It is thus our belief that taking such patterns into
account in the protocol finding and bug finding processes
can ease the process of checking the results and make it
possible to consider protocols that occur very rarely, and
thus are often overlooked by statistics-based approaches.
Existing tools, however, either provide no mechanism for the
user to influence the protocol-finding or bug-finding process,
or only provide mechanisms that are disassociated from the
code structure, making it difficult to interpret the results at
bug-checking time.
In this paper, we propose a “WYSIWIB” (What You See
Is Where It Bugs) approach to protocol and bug finding in
Linux code, based on the following steps: 1) describe a class
of protocols generically, and apply this description to the
Linux source code to collect a set of protocols, 2) instantiate
a collection of descriptions of various possible bug patterns
for the detected protocols, and 3) apply these descriptions to
the Linux source code to collect possible protocol violations.
This approach directly exploits the user’s knowledge of the
source code and guides the validation of the reported bugs
based on information explicit in the specification. Our ap-
proach is furthermore complementary to statistics-based ap-
proaches, in that it considers how to describe what to search
for, while statistics-based approaches consider how to select
from the things that are found.
Concretely, we have implemented our approach as col-
lection of tools based on the Coccinelle transformation en-
gine [7]. A key feature of Coccinelle is that specifications
are written using a language that is very close to C code,
thus easing specification development.
The contributions of this work are:
• We propose a framework for finding protocols in Linux
code, iteratively refining them, and using them to find
bugs. This framework chiefly builds on the Coccinelle
system, but provides some new complementary tools.
• We present three case studies illustrating the use of our
approach for finding protocols and bugs. Two of these in-
volve general-purpose classes of protocols. One of them
was inspired by a bug fix that was submitted to Linux,
illustrating the adaptability of our approach.
• Our case studies find over 3500 potential protocols, with
estimated false positive rates ranging from 2% to 55%.
Based on these protocols, we have used our framework
to find 395 bugs that we have validated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the aspects of Coccinelle that are necessary to under-
stand the rest of the paper. Section 3 describes our protocol-
finding and bug-finding framework. Sections 4 through 6
each present a case study, illustrating the processing of var-
ious kinds of common protocols. Section 7 surveys some of
the current limitations of our approach. Finally, Section 8
describes related work and Section 9 concludes.
2. Coccinelle
Coccinelle is a tool for performing control-flow based pro-
gram searches and transformations in C code [7]. It provides
a language, SmPL, for specifying searches and transforma-
tions and an engine for performing them. In this paper, we
write SmPL code for defining semantic matches, which are
used for code searching. We present SmPL in terms of a sim-
ple semantic match inspired by the case study reported in
Section 5.
The semantic match shown in Figure 1 detects cases
where a value allocated using the Linux netlink memory
allocation function nlmsg new is deallocated using the
generic deallocation function kfree skb. Such a deallo-
cation is undesirable, because the netlink library defines its
own deallocation function nlmsg free. The semantic match
consists of two rules, the first named bad kfree and written
in SmPL, and the second with no name written using the
SmPL interface to Python. Each rule begins with the dec-
laration of a collection of metavariables, and then follows
with either a C-code based pattern for specifying a match
in the case of a SmPL rule, or ordinary Python code in the
case of a Python rule. The notation is based on the Linux
patch syntax, in that the code patterns have the structure of
ordinary C code. In the rest of this section, we describe each
of these rules in more detail, and give a brief tour of some of
the other features of SmPL.
The rule bad kfree defines three metavariables: x and E,
which represent arbitrary expressions, and p, which rep-
resents an arbitrary position in the source program. Once
bound, a metavariable must have the same value within the
current control-flow path, and thus, for example, the occur-
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1 @bad kfree exists@
2 expression x,E;
3 position p;
4 @@
5
6 x = nlmsg_new(...)
7 ... when != x = E
8 kfree_skb@p(x);
9
10 @ script:python @
11 x << bad kfree.x;
12 p << bad kfree.p;
13 @@
14 print "line: %s x: %s" % (p[0].line,x)
Figure 1: A semantic match searching for certain uses of kfree -
skb
rences of x on lines 6, 7, and 8 must all match the same
expression. The code pattern in the body of the rule consists
of essentially C code mixed with some operators to raise the
level of abstraction, so that a single semantic match can ap-
ply to many code sites. This semantic match uses the oper-
ator “...” to represent a sequence of terms. In line 8 this
represents a sequence of expressions in the argument list
of nlmsg new and in line 9 this represents an arbitrary se-
quence of statements reachable from code matching the call
to nlmsg new along any control-flow path. By default such
a sequence of statements is quantified over all paths, by the
annotation exists next to the rule name indicates that for
this rule there need exist only one. Many of the remaining
features of SmPL are devoted to expressing constraints on
these sequences, using the operation when. This rule uses
when (line 7) to indicate that there should be no reassign-
ment of x before reaching the call to kfree skb.
Python rules do not perform any matching against the
source program, but may inherit metavariables from other
rules, using the notation rule.metaname, and do some pro-
cessing of their values. We only use Python for printing out
information about the found protocols and bugs. In this ex-
ample, the Python rule inherits the expression metavariable
x holding the allocated value and the position metavariable
holding the position of the call to kfree skb. It prints the
line on which the call to kfree skb occurs and the text
associated with the expression x. The Python interface is a
new feature as compared to earlier work on Coccinelle and
has been essential to managing the results of our semantic
matches. We often use Python to print out information in the
form expected by an emacs mode that we have developed,
based on the emacs org mode, to quickly find and validate
reported bug sites.
In the more general case, a semantic match can consist
of any number of rules, each of which can inherit metavari-
ables from any previous ones. A rule only applies when
the pattern matches completely. A rule is applied once for
each possible set of values of the inherited metavariables.
Besides “...”, SmPL provides nests, <...pattern ...>,
and disjunctions, (pattern1| . . . |patternn). A nest matches
a sequence, like “...”, but additionally can match zero or
more occurrences of pattern within the matched sequence.
A disjunction matches any of the patterns pattern1 through
pattern
n
. The remaining SmPL operators describe further
constraints on the sequences matched by “...” or a nest. By
default such a sequence is the shortest path between code
matching the patterns before and after the sequence oper-
ator. The annotation when any removes this shortest path
restriction, allowing any number of instances of such code
to occur within the path as well. Finally, by default, the uni-
versal quantification over paths does not require the com-
plete pattern to appear on control-flow paths that end in error
handling code (identified, in accordance with typical Linux
programming style, as any code that has the form of a con-
ditional ending in a return). The operator when strict re-
quires full universal quantification without this relaxation.
Convention Coccinelle includes “...” as an operator in
the language, but this notation is also convenient for showing
where code is omitted in examples. We will by convention
reserve “...” for the Coccinelle operator and use [...]
to represent omitted code. Furthermore, we frequently use
[...] in Python rules, rather than showing the Python code.
In such rules, the significant part is the list of inherited
metavariables, which indicates what will be printed out.
3. The bug-finding process
There are many sources of information for finding bugs.
One can study the bug reports of others, notice a suspicious
coding pattern while doing some other work on the code,
or learn from sources such as code comments, newsgroups,
or research papers about coding protocols that programmers
may sometimes overlook. The problem then is to turn this
awareness of the potential for bugs into actual bug detection.
Typically, bug finding depends highly on chance, as the
person who is aware of the protocol must be looking at
the specific code containing the bug and have the protocol
in mind at that time. The goal of this work is to enable a
programmer who becomes aware of a potential pattern of
bugs in protocol usage to easily search for instances of this
pattern throughout the code base, and to explore variants of
the pattern as they become apparent.
To motivate our choice of methodology, we begin with a
story drawn from our experience in finding and fixing bugs
in Linux code. In December 2007, a patch,1 shown in Fig-
ure 2, was submitted to Linux. This patch was based on the
observation that the function netif rx could free its argu-
ment, and that thus it was not safe to refer to its argument af-
ter calling the function. The developer had found and fixed
the problem in one file. We saw this patch and wondered
whether there could be other calls to the same function with
the same property. A semantic match for detecting such calls
1 d30f53aeb31d453a5230f526bea592af07944564 in the git repository
http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/
linux-2.6.git;a=summary. All subsequent git codes refer to this
repository.
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is shown in Figure 3a. It is similar in structure to the seman-
tic match of Figure 1, except for the use of a disjunction on
lines 8-12. This disjunction causes the position metavariable
p used on line 11 only to record the positions of references
to skb that do not match the first pattern, i.e., are not on the
left hand side of an assignment.
--- a/drivers/net/smc911x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/smc911x.c
@@ -1299,9 +1299,9 @@ smc911x_rx_dma_irq(int dma, void *data)
PRINT_PKT(skb->data, skb->len);
dev->last_rx = jiffies;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
- netif_rx(skb);
dev->stats.rx_packets++;
dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
+ netif_rx(skb);
spin_lock_irqsave(&lp->lock, flags);
pkts = (SMC_GET_RX_FIFO_INF() & RX_FIFO_INF_RXSUSED_) >> 16;
Figure 2:A standard patch addressing one instance of the netif -
rx problem
1 @r exists@
2 expression skb,e,e1;
3 position p;
4 @@
5
6 netif_rx(skb);
7 ... when != skb = e
8 (
9 skb = e1
10 |
11 skb@p
12 )
13 @ script:python @
14 skb << r.skb;
15 p << r.p;
16 @@
17 [...]
(a)
1 @r exists@
2 expression skb,e,e1;
3 position p;
4 @@
5
6 (
7 netif_rx(skb);
8 |
9 netif_rx_ni(skb);
10 )
11 ... when != skb = e
12 (
13 skb = e1
14 |
15 skb@p
16 )
17
18 @ script:python @
19 skb << r.skb;
20 p << r.p;
21 @@
22 [...]
(b)
Figure 3: The original (a) and extended (b) semantic matches for
finding netif rx problems
This semantic match found some potential bugs. In the
process of validating them, however, we found that the func-
tion netif rx ni also had the same property. We thus aug-
mented the semantic match as shown in Figure 3b to allow
it to match calls to either function. The resulting semantic
match found 5 occurrences of this pattern, all of which have
been acknowledged as bugs by the Linux developers. So far,
our corrections for 4 of these bugs have been accepted into
the Linux kernel.2
This episode clearly highlights how a flexible searching
tool such as Coccinelle can find bug patterns more efficiently
2Git codes 299f590f26da9764f20e905879f0090552ff2e86,
505a41d43c24345f3fa77ddab152d1f82dd8264d, and
9b3efc0133a807070dbd21254102995b65969965.
and completely than a human programmer. But still, it does
not go far enough. Rather than accidentally finding another
function that follows the same protocol as one that caused
a bug, we would like to be able to find all of the functions
that follow that protocol, and then create a bug finding rule
for each of them. Indeed, it can be useful to iterate this pro-
cess, instantiating a collection of semantic match templates
according to a set of protocols, where each semantic match
template either expresses a bug finding rule or collects more
information. We explore this approach with respect to the
netif rx example in Section 6.
Figure 4 illustrates the use of a framework that we have
developed for using Coccinelle in an iterated protocol find-
ing and bug finding process. This framework involves four
tools: Search, Instantiate, MultiSearch, and Make-
BugReport. Search, MultiSearch, and MakeBugReport
use Coccinelle in various ways, while Instantiate is a
separate tool. We describe these tools below:
MakeBugReport MultiSearch
Instantiate
....
Instantiate
....
Collected
Info
Bug
Report
BugSM1' BugSM1'' BugSM1''' ProtSM1' ProtSM1'' ProtSM1'''
Instantiate Instantiate
Collected
Info
Search
ProtSM Linux
Linux
 
Linux
 
BugSMTemp3BugSMTemp2
BugSMTemp1 ProtSMTemp1
Figure 4: Protocol and bug-finding process
Search The protocol and bug finding process begins when
the programmer has an idea of a certain kind of function
or collection of functions whose usage protocol may be
error prone. He expresses this idea as a semantic match
that expresses various properties of the kind of code he is
interested in and uses Python to print relevant information
about the matched terms. Figure 5 illustrates such a semantic
match, which detects any pair of functions f and g. The
Python code prints information about these functions in the
format expected by the Instantiate tool. The first field of
this output is a tag that characterizes this match. A semantic
match may use multiple such tags to separate various kinds
of matched code into categories, as done in the case study
in Section 4. The remainder of the output is a sequence of
key-value pairs. By convention, we write the key in capital
letters. The value is typically some part of the matched code,
often the name of a matched function that was found to have
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some property with respect to the protocol. For the semantic
match in Figure 5, the output might contain:
protocol: START: atomic_dec_and_test, FINISH: spin_unlock_bh
protocol: START: list_add_tail, FINISH: spin_unlock_bh
protocol: START: read_lock_bh, FINISH: read_unlock_bh
[...]
1 @ r @
2 identifier f,g;
3 @@
4
5 f(...)
6 ...
7 g(...)
8
9 @ script:python@
10 f << r.f;
11 g << r.g;
12 @@
13 print "protocol: START: %s, FINISH: %s" % (f,g)
Figure 5: A protocol-finding semantic match, suitable for starting
the protocol finding and bug finding process
After having developed the protocol-finding semantic
match, the programmer gives it to the Search tool, which
uses Coccinelle to apply it to each file of the Linux kernel.
The results are collected in a single output file. The pro-
grammer may inspect this result to assess the accuracy of
the protocol-finding semantic match. If it contains entries
that the programmer knows do not correspond to valid pro-
tocols or it is missing some protocols that the programmer
is otherwise aware of, then he can refine the semantic match
to eliminate these false positives and false negatives.
Instantiate Having obtained information about a collec-
tion of protocols from the initial protocol-finding semantic
match, the programmer then considers what kinds of bugs
are relevant or what other information might be needed to
find bugs. For each kind of bug or other needed information,
he writes a semantic match template, which is parameter-
ized by the various keys used in reporting the result of the
previous step. He then applies the tool Instantiate to the
semantic match template, the result of the initial protocol-
finding semantic match, and a tag. The result is a collection
of semantic matches, one for each element of the result of
the previous step that is associated with the given tag.
A semantic match template that is used to search for more
information should print output in the form illustrated in
Figure 5. A semantic match template that is used to search
for bugs should print output in the form recognized by our
emacs interface, so that the bugs can be easily validated. An
example of a semantic match template that searches for more
information is shown in Figure 6. It finds functions h that are
called at least once, as indicated by the + on the nest brack-
ets, after a call to the previously identified function FINISH
and before the previously identified function START. This se-
mantic match template would be instantiated with respect to
each of the pairs of functions identified by Search.
1 @ r @
2 identifier h;
3 @@
4
5 FINISH(...)
6 <+... h(...) ...+>
7 START(...)
8
9 @ script:python@
10 h << r.h;
12 @@
13 print "protocol: FN1: START FN2: FINISH EXTRA: %s" % h
Figure 6: A protocol-finding semantic match, suitable for starting
the protocol finding and bug finding process
MultiSearch and MakeBugReport MultiSearch is used
to search for further information based on a collection of in-
stantiated semantic match templates, while MakeBugReport
is used to search for bugs. MultiSearch takes as input a
collection of semantic matches produced by Instantiate,
uses Coccinelle to apply each of them to the Linux ker-
nel, and collects the results in a form suitable for passing
to Instantiate again. MakeBugReport does essentially
the same, but collects the result into a bug report for further
processing with emacs. In either case, examining the results
may cause the programmer to refine the corresponding se-
mantic match template or make him aware of new kinds of
bugs that are relevant to the protocol, for which new seman-
tic match templates can be developed.
The next three sections illustrate the use of this process
on three case studies, each illustrating a different strategy for
finding protocols and bugs. The first case study tries to find
protocols by studying function definitions, while the second
considers function call sites. The former can be more accu-
rate, because it can analyze the function’s precise behavior,
but it is not always possible, e.g., in software that depends
on libraries for which the source code is not available. The
third case study is based on the netif rx example, and il-
lustrates how our approach makes it possible to easily search
for specific kinds of bugs as the programmer becomes aware
of them. All of the code snippets used to illustrate these case
studies have been selected using semantic matches. The bugs
we have identified have not yet been validated by the Linux
developers. However, our assessment of the number of bugs
is based on careful study of the code building on previous
experience obtained for patches we have submitted and had
accepted, as listed at the Coccinelle web site.3 All of our
experiments are based on a snapshot of Linux dated March
11, 20074 and were run on an HP ProLiant server with two
3GHz quad-core Xeon processors and 16GB memory.
3 http://www.emn.fr/x-info/coccinelle/
4Git code baadac8b10c5ac15ce3d26b68fa266c8889b163f.
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4. Case Study 1: Detecting Inconsistent
Error Checks
The C programming language does not provide any built-in
exception handling mechanism, and thus applications must
define their own protocols for detecting and handling excep-
tional conditions. In Linux, pointer-typed functions typically
return either NULL, a value constructed with ERR PTR,5 or
both to indicate failure. Code using such functions must then
correspondingly follow one of three protocols before deref-
erencing the result: 1) testing the value for NULL, 2) testing
the value for ERR PTR using the function IS ERR, or 3) per-
forming both tests. Choosing the wrong protocol amounts
to performing either inappropriate tests or insufficient tests
and can lead to invalid pointer dereferences that can crash
the Linux kernel. In this section, we consider how to clas-
sify functions in terms of the kinds of error values they may
return and how to detect various kinds of bugs in their use.
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Figure 7: The use of NULL and ERR PTR in the Linux kernel by
directory
4.1 Protocol detection
We detect instances of the above protocols by examining
function definitions to infer the usage protocols that they im-
ply. Our goal is to write a protocol finding semantic match
that identifies functions in the following categories: Cate-
gory 1) Functions that indicate an error by returning NULL;
Category 2) Functions that indicate an error by returning a
value created using ERR PTR; Category 3) Functions that in-
dicate an error by returning either NULL or ERR PTR.
To give an overview of the strategies used by our proto-
col finding semantic match, we consider the Linux functions
simple alloc urb and clk get shown in Figure 8. Rele-
vant code is highlighted in italics. As illustrated by lines 7,
16, and 23, a function may explicitly return NULL, ERR PTR,
or a pointer created using &, or it may store such values in
some variable and then return the value of that variable. Of-
ten, however, the return value is derived from a more com-
plex expression, typically a function call, about which we
have no direct information. Nevertheless, it may be possi-
ble to infer some information about such an expression from
5 For conciseness, we subsequently refer to “a value constructed with
ERR PTR” as just “ERR PTR”.
the ways in which its value is used. For example, in line 9,
the conditional test implies that the variable urb is NULL at
the point of the return, and in line 14, the dereference of
urb means that its value can subsequently be assumed to be
a valid pointer. These observations allow us to conclude that
the function simple alloc urb in Figure 8a is a category 1
function. Similar observations allow us to identify category
2 and 3 functions. For the function clk get, however, we
do not have enough information to classify the function, due
to the function call in line 22. In this case, we consider the
function to be unknown.
1 static struct urb *simple_alloc_urb (
2 struct usb_device *udev,
3 int pipe, unsigned long bytes)
4 {
5 struct urb *urb;
6
7 if (bytes < 0) return NULL; // explicit null
8 urb = usb_alloc_urb (0, GFP_KERNEL);
9 if (!urb) return urb; // null inferred from test
10 ...
11 if (!urb->transfer_buffer) {
12 usb_free_urb (urb);
13 urb = NULL;
14 } else memset (urb->transfer buffer, 0, bytes);
15 // null or valid pointer inferred from assignment or dereference
16 return urb;
17 }
18
19 struct clk *clk_get(struct device *dev, const char *id)
20 {
21 if (clk_functions.clk_get)
22 return clk functions.clk get(dev, id);
23 return ERR PTR(-ENOSYS);
24 }
(b)
Figure 8: Functions illustrating various ways of returning er-
ror codes. These functions are defined in drivers/usb/misc/
usbtest.c and arch/powerpc/kernel/clock.c, respectively
We now consider how to write a semantic match that
expresses these intuitions. This semantic match is used in
the role of “ProtSM” in Figure 4. The semantic match is in
four phases, as shown in Figures 9 to 12.
Phase 1: making information explicit As illustrated on
line 9 of Figure 8, it is possible to determine whether var-
ious variables are NULL or ERR PTR from the conditional
tests that appear in the function. To avoid having to sub-
sequently consider many special cases, this initial phase
makes such information explicit, by introducing correspond-
ing assignments under such conditional tests. For example,
line 9 of simple alloc urb becomes if (!urb) { urb
= NULL; return urb; }.
Figure 9 shows the transformation rule for NULL tests.
There is a similar rule for IS ERR tests. These rules make
use of the transformation features of Coccinelle, where lines
that are annotated with - are removed and lines that are
annotated with + are added. These rules furthermore make
use of a feature of Coccinelle known as an isomorphism
[7], i.e., a collection of terms having different forms but
essentially the same meaning. Here we take advantage of
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built-in isomorphisms that convert E == NULL to NULL ==
E and !E, interchange the arguments of && and ||, and
interchange the conditional branches. Nevertheless, SmPL
cannot express arbitrary repetitions of operators, and so the
pattern does not match cases where the NULL or IS ERR
test is deeply nested within the test expression. Still, we
have been able to classify almost 3000 functions into the
categories 1, 2, and 3 despite this limitation.
1 @t1 using "likely.iso" disable add_parens @
2 expression *E;
3 identifier def0.f;
4 statement S1, S2;
5 @@
6
7 f(...) {
8 <...
9 (
10 if ((E == NULL | E == NULL&&...))
11 + {
12 + E = NULL;
13 S1
14 + }
15 else S2
16 |
17 if ((E != NULL | E != NULL||...)) S1
18 + else E = NULL;
19 )
20 ...>
21 }
Figure 9:Making NULL values explicit
Phase 2: detecting returns of NULL and ERR PTR The
second phase detects functions that somewhere return NULL,
ERR PTR, or both. The rule for the NULL case, shown in
Figure 10, checks that a function contains either an explicit
return of NULL (line 9) or an assignment of some expression
to NULL followed by a return of that expression (lines 11-14).
It does not handle arbitrary levels of aliasing, but this rarely
occurs intraprocedurally in Linux code.
1 @returns null exists@
2 identifier def0.f,fld;
3 expression E, E1;
4 @@
5
6 f(...) {
7 ... when any
8 (
9 return NULL;
10 |
11 E = NULL;
12 ... when != ( E = E1 | E->fld )
13 return E;
14 )
15 }
Figure 10: Detecting returns of NULL and ERR PTR
Phase 3: detecting unknown return values This phase de-
tects cases where the return value is derived from an expres-
sion that is not NULL, ERR PTR or an explicit pointer, and that
is never dereferenced. We have no information about such
expressions, and so such a function must be in the category
unknown. The rules implementing this phase are shown in
Figure 11. The first rule uses the position metavariable p to
mark the locations of all of the assignments where the as-
signed value is either NULL, ERR PTR or an explicit pointer
(line 9). The second rule detects returns where the argument
has been assigned, but not by one of the assignments de-
tected in the first rule, or has not been assigned at all, as
would be the case of an explicit function call. In either case,
a when clause checks that the returned value is not derefer-
enced, and is thus not known to be a valid pointer.
1 @a depends on !returns null || !returns errptr @
2 position p;
3 identifier def0.f;
4 expression E,E1;
5 @@
6
7 f(...) {
8 <...
9 ( E@p = ERR_PTR(...) | E@p = NULL | E@p = &E1 )
10 ...>
11 }
12
13 @b depends on !returns null || !returns errptr exists@
14 identifier def0.f, fld;
15 expression E,E1,E2;
16 position p, p1, p2 != a.p;
17 @@
18
19 f@p(...) {
20 (
21 ... when any
22 E@p2 = E1
23 ... when != ( E = E2 | E->fld )
24 return@p1 E;
25 |
26 ... when != ( E = E2 | E->fld )
27 return@p1 E;
28 )
29 }
Figure 11: Detecting unknown return values
Phase 4: classifying the functions At this point, we have
collected enough information to classify the functions. The
rule cat1, shown in Figure 12 considers a function to be in
category 1 if every path through the function ends with ei-
ther a return of NULL, a return of a pointer created with &
or a return that was not classified as unknown by phase 3.
A second rule, notcat1, which is not shown, ensures that
there is not another definition of the function that returns an
unknown value, as may occur if #ifdef is used to provide
multiple definitions of the function within a single file. Fi-
nally, a Python rule prints out the name of any function that
satisfies cat1 and does not satisfy notcat1, indicating that
the function is in category 1. A similar Python rule, which is
not shown, indicates that the function is unknown if it satis-
fies notcat1.
Similar rules identify functions in category 2. Category
3 functions are those that were found to somewhere return
NULL and to somewhere return ERR PTR in phase 2. Other
pointer-typed functions are considered unknown.
Experimental results Figure 13 shows the result of apply-
ing Search to the above semantic match, in terms of the
number of pointer-typed functions that are classified as into
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1 @cat1 depends on returns null && !returns errptr@
2 position p, p2 != b.p1;
3 identifier def0.f;
4 expression E;
5 @@
6
7 f@p(...) {
8 ... when strict
9 ( return NULL; | return &E; | return@p2 E; )
10 }
11
12 @ script:python depends on cat1 && !notcat1@
13 f << def0.f;
14 @@
15 print "category1: FN:%s" % f
Figure 12: Classifying the functions
each category. Due to time constraints, we have not been
able to verify all of these results. Instead, we have randomly
selected 50 functions from each category and studied its
definition to determine the validity of the classification. As
shown in Figure 13, we find very few false positives. All of
the false positives derive from the inadequate interpretation
of conditionals. In the case of categories 1 and 2, the false
positives are typically in cases where the return value can
actually be unknown. All of the category 3 false positives
are actually in category 2, since the values involved in the
conditional tests imply that a return value of NULL is impos-
sible.
classified validated false positives
category 1 2394 50 1
category 2 480 50 2
category 3 100 50 4
unknown 6940 N/A N/A
Figure 13: Results of classifying pointer-typed functions
Approaches that are based on data mining or statistics
infer protocols from frequently occurring patterns of usage
[3, 6]. Figure 14 shows that many of the functions that we
have classified are directly called only a few times. Some
functions are indicated as being called 0 times because they
are only used as the value of a function pointer.
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Figure 14: Call frequency for the categorized functions within the
Linux kernel source code
4.2 Bug detection
As noted at the beginning of the section, performing inappro-
priate tests and performing insufficient tests are both unde-
sirable. We thus write bug-finding semantic match templates
for each of these cases, and instantiate them with respect to
the functions identified in the protocol-finding phase.
Inappropriate tests Figure 15 shows a semantic match
template for detecting inappropriate tests for each possible
function, FN, in category 1. The rule match detects the case
where an expression x is assigned the result of calling a FN
(line 6) and then tested using IS ERR (line 8). This check,
however, is not sufficient, because there may be some other
value of this expression that can reach the test, via another
execution path, and it might be legitimate to test this other
value for IS ERR. The second rule detects an initialization
of x that is at a different position from any one matched
in the first rule (line 15), as required by the constraint on
the position metavariable p1 (line 12). Finally, the Python
code, which prints the result, is triggered only if the first
rule matches and the second one does not (line 19). Another
pair of rules, which is not shown, considers the case where
the call appears explicitly in the argument of the IS ERR
test. The semantic match template for category 2 functions
is similar, but checks for various kinds of NULL tests rather
than an IS ERR test.
1 @match exists@
2 expression x, E;
3 position p1,p2;
4 @@
5
6 x@p1 = FN(...)
7 ... when != x = E
8 IS_ERR(x@p2)
9
10 @other match exists@
11 expression match.x, E1, E2;
12 position p1!=match.p1,match.p2;
13 @@
14
15 x@p1 = E1
16 ... when != x = E2
17 IS_ERR(x@p2)
18
19 @ script:python depends on !other match@
20 p1 << match.p1;
21 p2 << match.p2;
22 @@
23 [...]
Figure 15: Template for detecting inappropriate tests
Figure 16 shows the result of applying MakeBugReport
to this semantic match template, in terms of the number of
potential bug sites found and the number of false positives.
We consider a potential bug site to be a single function call
for which there is at least one inappropriate test. 28 potential
bug sites are reported in all. There is only one false positive,
which is due to a limitation in Coccinelle’s treatment of
variable declarations that initialize more than one variable.
reported sites bugs false positives
category 1 2 2 0
category 2 26 25 1
Figure 16: Inappropriate tests bugs
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Figure 17 shows an example of a bug found with the
semantic match template for category 2 functions. This
code comes from the function aaci probe in the file
sound/arm/aaci.c. When the call to aaci init card (line
1) returns ERR PTR, control jumps to the out label (line 4).
There the result of the call is tested again, this time for being
non-NULL (line 8). This test succeeds, because an ERR PTR
value is always different from NULL. The subsequent deref-
erence to access the card field (line 9), will then crash the
kernel, because aaci is an invalid pointer.
1 aaci = aaci_init_card(dev);
2 if (IS_ERR(aaci))
3 ret = PTR_ERR(aaci);
4 goto out;
5
6 [...]
7 out:
8 if (aaci)
9 snd_card_free(aaci->card);
Figure 17: An inappropriate test found with the template for cate-
gory 2 functions
Insufficient tests Figures 18 to 20 show extracts of a se-
mantic match template for detecting calls to category 1 func-
tions where there is no NULL test before dereferencing the
result. The rules for categories 2 and 3 are similar. The se-
mantic match proceeds in three phases.
The first phase, as in the protocol-finding semantic match,
reorganizes the code to simplify the subsequent analysis.
Here, the reorganization transforms tests by breaking apart
conjunctions and disjunctions, as shown for conjunctions in
conditionals in Figure 18.
1 @and depends on def0 using "../likely.iso" disable and_comm @
2 position xtesta.p;
3 expression E1, E2;
4 statement S1, S2;
5 @@
6
7 - if@p (E1 && E2) S1
8 + if (E1) { if (E2) S1 }
Figure 18: Phase 1: Reorganization of conditional tests
The second phase detects cases where a dereference is
known to be safe. This can be because the dereference is
guarded by a test of the expression for NULL (e.g., by a
conditional or loop test), or because there is a conditional
that tests the expression for NULL and then either updates the
expression to some other value or aborts in some way (e.g., a
return or panic, but also a break or continue). Position
variables are used to remember the terms that are matched in
these cases. Figure 19 shows a simplified version of the rule
protected that collects in the metavariable p the positions
of dereferences protected by an enclosing NULL test (the
full rule also considers while and for loops and conditional
expressions). The rules updated and aborts, which are not
shown, match the remaining conditions.
1 @protected using "../likely.iso" @
2 expression def0.x;
3 identifier fld;
4 position p;
5 statement S;
6 @@
7
8 if ((x != NULL | x != NULL &&...)) {<... x@p->fld ...>} else S
Figure 19: Phase 2: Detecting dereferences protected by an enclos-
ing conditional
Finally, the third phase, shown in Figure 20, detects and
prints the potential bug sites. Starting from an assignment of
some expression x to the result of a call to the category 1
function FN (line 12), the rule finds any subsequent derefer-
ence of the returned value that is not preceded by a reassign-
ment of x and that is not at a position identified by protected.
The search furthermore stops at a call to BUG ON that tests for
NULL, as this aborts the kernel, and at the conditionals identi-
fied by the unprotected and aborts rules. Finally, the Python
code prints a bug report for each pair of a call to the category
1 function and an identified dereference.
1 @unprotected using "../likely.iso" exists@
2 expression def0.x;
3 identifier fld, fld1;
4 position p != protected.p;
5 position call.p1;
6 position any updated.px;
7 position any aborts.ab;
8 statement S,S1;
9 expression E;
10 @@
11
12 x@p1 = FN(...)
13 ... when != ( x = E | x->fld1 )
14 (
15 BUG_ON((x == NULL | x == NULL||...));
16 |
17 if@ab (...) S1 else S
18 |
19 if@px (...) S1 else S
20 |
21 x@p->fld
22 )
23
24 @ script:python @
25 p << unprotected.p; // position of ref
26 p1 << call.p1; // position of call
27 fld << unprotected.fld;
28 @@
29 [...]
Figure 20: Phase 3: Detecting unprotected dereferences
Figure 21 shows the result of applying MakeBugReport
to this semantic match template, in terms of the number of
potential bug sites found and the number of false positives.
We consider a potential bug site to be a single function call
for which there are one or more dereferences of the result
without a previous required check. 535 potential bugs are
reported in all, of which over 90% are for category 1 func-
tions. For category 1, we have verified 250 potential bug
sites, due to time limitations. For the other categories, we
have verified all reported bugs. In all there are 42 false posi-
tives, with again most being for category 1. The reasons for
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the false positives vary. The most common are that a deref-
erence occurred at the destination of a goto, causing the se-
mantic match not to detect that it was protected by a prior
NULL test, and that the NULL test was present, but embedded
in the definition of some other called function. The former
issue could be addressed by enhancing the semantic match
to check whether code at the destination of a goto is only
reachable from code where the test has been performed. Ad-
dressing the latter issue in general would require an interpro-
cedural analysis.
reported validated bugs false
sites sites positives
category 1 496 250 215 35
category 2 20 20 16 4
category 3 19 19 16 3
Figure 21: Insufficient tests bugs
Figure 22 shows an example of a typical bug found with
the semantic match template for category 1 functions. This
code calls the function alloc ctrl packet (line 1), which
defined in the same file, calls the generic memory allocation
function kzalloc and returns NULL if the memory allocation
fails. In this case, the dereference in line 5 will crash the
kernel.
1 ver_packet = alloc_ctrl_packet(
2 sizeof(struct ipw_setup_get_version_query_packet),
3 ADDR_SETUP_PROT, TL_PROTOCOLID_SETUP,
4 TL_SETUP_SIGNO_GET_VERSION_QRY);
5 ver_packet->header.length =
6 sizeof(struct tl_setup_get_version_qry);
Figure 22: An insufficient tests bug in the function
ipw send setup packet in the file drivers/char/pcmcia/ipwireless/
hardware.c
5. Case Study 2: Detecting Allocation and
Deallocation Functions
Linux code contains many functions that allocate and deallo-
cate resources. Often these are wrappers around generic allo-
cation functions, such as kmalloc, that additionally perform
service-specific initializations. Such functions may also be
used to manage reference counts. The goal of this case study
is to detect functions that allocate and deallocate resources,
and bugs in their usage.
5.1 Protocol detection
We consider allocation and deallocation of resources that are
represented as pointer values. Allocation and deallocation of
such resources are carried out by function calls. The chal-
lenge is to distinguish allocation and deallocation functions
from functions that manipulate the data in other ways, such
as accessing its fields or storing it more permanently, e.g., in
a global variable. In this case study, we try to characterize a
pair of allocation and deallocation functions based on how
they are used.
Our strategy is based on the following observations.
When a function calls an allocation function, it typically
tests the returned resource for validity and then saves or
deallocates this result. In particular, when an error occurs
in such a function, the function typically deallocates the re-
source before returning. Indeed, deallocation must be done
if the resource is only stored in a local variable. This pat-
tern is illustrated by the code fragment shown in Figure 23.
Line 10 uses the function alloc tty driver to allocate a
tty driver resource, and the result is stored in the local
variable drv. The result is checked for validity in the next
line. The result remains in a local variable until the condi-
tional on line 14, which checks for an error condition. If an
error has occurred, the conditional frees the resource drv on
line 15 using the function put tty driver and returns an
error value, -1.
1 static int capinc_tty_init(void)
2 {
3 struct tty driver *drv;
4
5 if (capi_ttyminors > CAPINC_MAX_PORTS)
6 capi_ttyminors = CAPINC_MAX_PORTS;
7 if (capi_ttyminors <= 0)
8 capi_ttyminors = CAPINC_NR_PORTS;
9
10 drv = alloc tty driver(capi ttyminors);
11 if (!drv)
12 return -ENOMEM;
13 ... // initializations of various fields of dev
14 if (tty register driver(drv)) {
15 put tty driver(drv);
16 printk(KERN_ERR "Couldn’t register capi_nc driver\n");
17 return -1;
18 }
19 capinc_tty_driver = drv;
20 return 0;
21 }
Figure 23: Extract of drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c. Code relevant to the
allocation-deallocation pattern is shown in italics.
A semantic match based on these observations is shown
in Figure 24. In this semantic match, the metavariable E
represents the local variable that contains the allocated value,
the metavariable f represents the allocation function, and
the metavariable g represents the deallocation function. The
metavariable f is specified not to be one of the basic memory
allocation functions, kmalloc, kzalloc, kcalloc (line 2),
because it is well-known that memory allocated with these
functions should be deallocated using kfree. Lines 9-13 of
the semantic match establish the pattern of an allocation.
These lines check for a local variable declaration (line 9),
then any subsequent assignment of that variable to the result
of a call to a function f (line 11), and finally a test whether the
initialized value of the local variable is NULL (line 13), which
is assumed to be a validity test on the result. Lines 18-25 of
the semantic match search for the pattern of a deallocation
under an error condition. This has the form of a conditional
(line 18) containing a call to a function g (line 22) that
takes the local variable as some argument, followed by a
return (line 24), with no intervening use of the local variable
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(line 23). The pattern furthermore specifies that within the
conditional and before the call to the deallocation function,
the local variable cannot be updated (line 19) stored in the
value of some other expression (line 20), or passed to another
function (line 21). The latter condition serves to avoid the
case where this other function stores the value in some more
permanent way, such as adding it to a global queue. Finally,
the same conditions are placed on the code between the
allocation code and the deallocation code. Any other code,
however, can appear, including other conditionals (line 17).
1 @alloc exists@
2 identifier E,f != { kmalloc,kcalloc,kzalloc },g,h1,h2;
3 expression E1,E2;
4 int ret!=0;
5 type T;
6 statement S;
7 @@
8
9 T *E;
10 ... when any
11 E = f(...);
12 ... when != E
13 if (E == NULL) S
14 ... when != ( E = E1; | E1 = E; | h1(...,E,...) )
15 when any
16 if (...) {
17 ... when != ( E = E2; | E2 = E; | h2(...,E,...) )
18 g(...,E,...);
19 ... when != E
20 return ret;
21 }
23
24 @ script:python @
25 f << alloc.f; // identifier
26 g << alloc.g; // identifier
27 @@
28 [...]
Figure 24: A simplified semantic match for detecting allocation-
deallocation protocols
This semantic match finds 376 pairs of allocation and
deallocation functions, but it overlooks a number of others
that do not match the specified code patterns in some way.
For example, an allocation can be described, as specified by
this semantic match, in three separate statements (declara-
tion, allocation, and validation) but some of these steps can
also be merged, i.e., the allocation can be part of the dec-
laration, or it can appear in the test expression of the con-
ditional performing the validation. Furthermore, the test ex-
pression of this conditional can be more complicated, using
the boolean operators && and ||. We can also allow for a
subsequent test using IS ERR, which has the form of a func-
tion call but is known not to save its argument. Finally, in
the deallocation part, the function g may return a value, and
the entire function may return a non-integer value, such as
NULL, or no result at all.
Our complete semantic match addressing the above is-
sues is about 20 lines longer than the one shown. It finds 602
pairs of allocation and deallocation functions, including all
of the ones found by the simplified version. We have stud-
ied 50 randomly selected pairs of identified allocation and
deallocation functions and found that 37 represent valid pro-
tocols and 13 are false positives. The most common reason
for a false positive is that the function identified as an allo-
cation function performs an access rather than an allocation,
and so the last function that uses the accessed data within
an error path is inappropriately identified as a deallocation
function.
Even the generalized semantic match is not able to de-
tect all allocation/deallocation protocols, because some such
functions may never be used in the context required by the
semantic match. For example, an allocation function may al-
ways be used in a context where its result is immediately
stored in a structure field or it may never be used in a func-
tion that needs to handle an error. The NULL test on the re-
sult of the allocation function might always be omitted, or it
might be expressed in a more convoluted way that is not de-
tected by the semantic match. All of these constraints were
built into the semantic match to try to reduce the number of
false positives while still finding many protocols. Neverthe-
less, the programmer could experiment with relaxing them.
This semantic match has focused on allocation functions
that return pointer-typed values where failure of the alloca-
tion is represented as NULL. It could easily be adapted to
the case where the allocation function returns ERR PTR to
indicate failure, or where the allocated information is repre-
sented as an integer rather than a pointer.
5.2 Bug detection
The bugs we search for have the form of a call to an alloca-
tion function with no subsequent call to a deallocation func-
tion. As in the protocol-finding semantic match, we focus on
values stored in local variables and error-handling code, to
reduce the number of false positives.
Searching for missing deallocations A simplified version
of the bug-finding semantic match template is shown in Fig-
ure 25. It follows the protocol-finding semantic match quite
closely, except that the calls to the deallocation function are
replaced by constraints that no call to the deallocation func-
tion appears. Finally, as compared to the protocol-detecting
semantic match, we also remove the constraint that the value
is not passed to another function, as our goal now is to find
as many bugs as possible.
The semantic match template from which this simplified
version has been constructed finds some bugs, as shown in
the first line of Figure 26, but it also finds about as many
false positives. In some cases, the value is passed to an
intermediate functions that either saves or deallocates it. In
particular, many Linux services define a cleanup function
that deallocates a number of resources that the service may
have allocated. In other cases, the deallocation is under a
conditional that is more complex that the NULL test checked
for in the rule in Figure 24.
To address this issue, we can exploit the ease of modify-
ing SmPL code to create more constrained semantic match
templates that match fewer bugs, but also fewer false posi-
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1 @bug exists@
2 type T;
3 identifier E;
4 expression E1,E2;
5 statement S,S1,S2;
6 int ret != 0;
7 position a,p;
8 @@
9
10 T *E;
11 ... when any
12 E = ALLOC@a(...);
13 ... when != E
14 if (E == NULL) S
15 ... when any
16 when != ( E = E1 | E1 = E | FREE(...,E,...) )
17 when != if (E != NULL) { ... FREE(...,E,...) ... }
18 (
19 if (E == NULL) S1 else S2
20 |
21 if (...) {
22 ... when != ( E = E2 | E2 = E | FREE(...,E,...) )
23 when != if (E != NULL) { ... FREE(...,E,...) ... }
24 return@p ret;
25 }
26 )
27
28 @ script:python @
29 a << bug.a;
30 p << bug.p;
31 @@
32 [...]
Figure 25: A simplified template for detecting missing dealloca-
tions
reported validated bugs false
sites sites positives
Full detection 470 180 81 99
Subsequent deallocation
required
158 100 50 50
Allocated data not
passed to an
intervening function
189 61 36 25
Both restrictions 76 43 27 15
Figure 26:Missing deallocation bugs
tives. One can then concentrate on a smaller, simpler bug re-
port in which the matched code has more commonality thus
making the bugs easier to verify. After having thoroughly
studied these simpler bug reports, one can return to the orig-
inal bug report and consider the remaining cases, having
gained more experience about the structure of the affected
code. We have considered three variants on the semantic
match of Figure 24: one where we require that there is a
deallocation of the same value after the conditional in which
a bug seems to occur, one in which we reintroduce the con-
straint that the value is not passed to any function between
the allcation and the conditional in which the bug seems to
occur, and one that combines the two. Other variants are pos-
sible.
Figure 26 also shows the result of projecting the infor-
mation about bugs and false obtained for the full semantic
match template onto the bug reports generated by the more
restricted versions. The first constraint has no significant im-
pact on the ratio of bugs to false positives, but imposing the
second constraint or combining the two substantially reduces
the number of false positives, while still making it possible
to find some bugs.
A special case Finally, we have created an extremely con-
strained semantic match template, which was motivated by
our study of the original reported bugs. In some cases, a
specific allocation function and deallocation function are de-
fined for a particular type of value. The allocation function
may, for example, allocate memory using kmalloc and ini-
tialize some fields, but in some cases the deallocation does
nothing specific at all, and simply calls a generic dealloca-
tion function such as kfree. Because the effect is the same,
code may use the generic function rather than the specific
one. This, however, represents a breaking of the abstraction
boundary, and can lead to problems later, if is becomes nec-
essary to augment the deallocation function. We have thus
written a semantic match to find deallocation functions that
simply call some other function with the same argument, and
then a semantic match to correct the bug by replacing calls
to these functions by calls to the specific variant that corre-
sponds to the allocation function that is used. In this case,
we use the tool MultiSearch to iterate the protocol-finding
process. The semantic match template identifying the rele-
vant deallocation functions is shown in Figure 27. The se-
mantic match template finding the bugs is a generalization
of the semantic match used to present Coccinelle in Section
2. This semantic match template can furthermore potentially
find bugs that the previously presented ones do not, because
it does not restrict the search for the deallocation function to
error conditions.
1 @r@
2 identifier f,x;
3 type T;
4 @@
5 FREE(T x) { f(x); }
6
9 @ script:python @
10 f << r.f;
11 @@
12 print "oneline: AL:ALLOC FR:FREE FN:%s" % f
Figure 27: A template for detecting a deallocation function that
simply calls another deallocation function
The semantic match template detecting deallocation func-
tions that simply call some other function on the same
argument detected 18 such deallocation functions, asso-
ciated with in all 24 allocation functions. Bugs are re-
ported in the use of three of the deallocation functions,
framebuffer release, nlmsg free, and vfree, for a to-
tal of 27 bug reports, all but two of which are in the use of
nlmsg free. The bug in the use of vfree is a false posi-
tive, as it is part of a conditional that tests whether vfree
or kfree should be used. Checking these bugs took only a
few minutes. These results clearly show the benefits of being
able to create semantic matches that check for very specific
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conditions, as there is the potential for a high rate of found
bugs and validation of these bugs can be very easy.
6. Case Study 3: Bug detection inspired by
the netif example
The third case study is motivated by the example presented
in Section 3. The essential feature of the bug that was origi-
nally found was that the function netif rx could free its ar-
gument, and that thus it was not safe to refer to its argument
after calling the function. Because use after free is a gen-
eral problem, we write a semantic match to find functions
that possibly or definitely free some argument, and then a
semantic match template to find calls to such function that
are followed by a dereference of that argument.
The number of bugs and false positives found are sum-
marized in Figure 28. Most of the false positives are where
the identified function FN decrements a reference count and
possibly frees its argument. At some calls to such a function
FN, the referece count is known to be greater than 1, and thus
the decrement cannot cause the value to be freed.
reported validated bugs false
sites sites positives
guaranteed free 10 10 5 5
possible free 22 22 9 13
Figure 28: Reference after call to a freeing function
7. Current Limitations
Coccinelle was originally designed for performing program
transformations. Although our approach has found a large
number of bugs in Linux code, our case studies have also re-
vealed some limitations of Coccinelle for protocol and bug
finding. These limitations include the lack of an interproce-
dural analysis, the lack of a dataflow analysis, the inability to
interpret arbitrarily complex conditional texts, and the need
to make some kinds of inferred infermation explicit in the
code. As a result, semantic matches can be complex. Fur-
thermore, they tend to become more complex as they are
refined, to eliminate false negatives and false positives.
Some of these limitations may be essential for transfor-
mation, where the user would like to retain very tight con-
trol over the conditions under which the transformation takes
place. For protocol and bug finding, however, it may be use-
ful to consider whether a weaker coupling between the code
fragments in the semantic match and the elements of the
matched code could make the approach easier to use while
maintaining or reducing the rate of false positives.
8. Related Work
Engler et al. [3] initiated the idea of using a checker that is
neither sound nor complete to provide the scalability needed
to find bugs in systems code. Enlger et al. also proposed [4]
to search for protocols in the form of pairs of functions that
occur together frequently. The former is based on checking
rules expressed as automata, that have a structure quite dif-
ferent from C code. The latter tends to find a very large num-
ber of candidate protocols, on which statistics are used to se-
lect the most likely. There is no opportunity for the user to
interject his understanding of the code structure. Later work
uses automata to characterize the behaviors of typical classes
of protocols, and then the user can participate in assigning
specific functions to roles in such an automaton [5]. But the
specifications remain distant from the source code.
Li and Zhou use data mining to collect sets of terms that
often occur together, and thus identify a number of complex
protocols in Linux and other open source systems [6]. Ra-
manathan et al. show that including path sensitivity in this
process significantly improves precision [8]. Coccinelle se-
mantic matches also take into account control-flow paths.
While the protocols we have detected in the case studies
in this paper involve essentially only two operations, more
complex protocols could be detected by writing more com-
plex semantic matches. In contrast to a data mining based
approach, in our approach the programmer must be aware of
the basic structure of the protocol, but we can exploit this
property to ease the protocol and bug validation process.
Weimer and Necula [10] propose an approach similar to
that of Engler et al. [4], but they focus on protocols and
bugs that occur in error paths, which gives them both a much
smaller set of potential protocols and a much smaller set of
false positives. In our second case study, we have also found
it useful to exploit the kinds of code that occur in error paths.
Our use of error paths is also tailored via the SmPL code to
the class of protocol being considered, rather than following
a fixed strategy as in Weimer and Necula’s work.
The Static Driver Verifier (SDV) [1], developed at Mi-
crosoft, uses model checking to prove that certain bugs do
not occur in systems code. Specifications amount to au-
tomata describing invalid behaviors. These automata are ex-
pressed in a C-like notation, but do not follow the structure
of the code to be processed. Because SDV gives a guaran-
tee of correctness, rather than just finding potential bugs, it
is more expensive than the aforementioned approaches. It is
thus better suited to being applied to individual drivers rather
than to an entire operating system.
In previous work [9], we have used Coccinelle to re-
express the bug-finding automata presented in the work of
Engler et al. [3]. That paper did not consider protocol find-
ing. Furthermore, it only considered a few very generic func-
tions, such as kmalloc and kfree, for which there appear
to be few remaining usage errors in Linux today.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a framework for searching
for protocols and bugs in Linux code. A principal goal of this
framework is to allow users to quickly and easily interject
their understanding of the code structure into the protocol
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and bug finding process. Our framework is based on the use
of the Coccinelle transformation tool that provides a speci-
fication language that is close to C code. We have comple-
mented Coccinelle with a collection of tools for managing a
series of searches that allow a uniform approach to protocol
and bug finding, based on strategies encoded by the user.
Coccinelle is unique among the tools used for protocol
and bug finding that we know of in that it supports program
transformation. This makes it possible to specify not only
how to find bugs but also how to fix them. For some of our
examples, such as replacing the use of a generic deallocation
function by a specific one, the change is very systematic and
creating a semantic patch is straightforward. More work is
necessary, however, to identify larger classes of bugs that
can be fixed automatically.
Availability The source code for the semantic matches
used in our experiments is available at the following URL:
http://www.diku.dk/~julia/bugs
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